Trump, the Right-Wing Populists, and Democracy by Merkel, Wolfgang
www.ssoar.info
Trump, the Right-Wing Populists, and Democracy
Merkel, Wolfgang
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Merkel, W. (2017). Trump, the Right-Wing Populists, and Democracy. Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte -
International Quarterly Edition: Journal of Social Democracy, 64(2), 20-26. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216227
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor








Article  —  Published Version
Trump, the Right-Wing Populists, and Democracy
Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte - International Quarterly Edition: Journal of Social
Democracy
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Merkel, Wolfgang (2017) : Trump, the Right-Wing Populists, and
Democracy, Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte - International Quarterly Edition: Journal of
Social Democracy, ISSN 2194-3095, Dietz, Berlin, Iss. 2, pp. 20-26
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216227
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
20  N G | F H – Q u a r t e r l y  2 | 2 017
Wolfgang Merkel
Trump, the Right-Wing Populists, and Democracy
When asked not long ago whom he would vote for on November 8, 2016, if he were 
an American, he replied unhesitatingly: »Trump. I am just horrified about him, but 
Hillary is the true danger.« »He« in this case is not just anybody; he is Slavoj Žižek, 
the  neo-Marxist philosopher of  the last decade, and a pop star of  the Internet. We 
can assume that Žižek could only have been horrified by his own bold endorsement 
the morning after the election.
In the meantime the unspeakable has happened: Donald Trump was elected as 
the 45th  President of  the United States. The New York billionaire, serial declarer of  
bankruptcy, chauvinist, sexist, the man with the baseball cap and the bad manners, a 
bigmouthed »Me Inc.« is now the most important politician of the (Western) world. 
Will  he  change  the  world  in  such  disastrous  ways  as  his  Republican  predecessor,  
George  W. Bush, did  during  his  presidency?  What  lessons  can  we  learn  about  the  
state of democracy in America from the campaign, the elections, and Trump’s politi-
cal program? Is Trump a uniquely American phenomenon, or is the United States 
once again holding up a mirror to the Europeans, showing them what their future 
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will look like, as Alexis de Tocqueville put it in his classic, Democracy in America? Is 
Trump’s electoral victory the revolt of those who have long felt unrepresented by the 
establishment, the »political class,« the media, public discourses, and an economic 
system that constantly generates more inequality? Is right-wing populism now arc-
ing across the Atlantic, too?
Prominent theorists of post-democracy from Colin Crouch to Jacques Rancière 
offer, among others, one crucial argument: in the post-democratic age, elections have 
deteriorated into an empty ritual. They simulate democracy rather than constituting 
its core element. Substantive matters play no role, or – if they do – the programs put 
forth by the putative political »rivals« have become indistinguishable. Like so many 
of the arguments advanced by theorists of post-democracy, this one is only half true. 
Indeed, neither the political programs presented in pre-election speeches nor those 
reported by the media carried much weight. What dominated the 2016 presiden-
tial campaign was mudslinging, i.e., personal attacks by one candidate against the 
other. »Crooked Hillary,« corrupt Hillary; she doesn’t belong in the White House; 
she should be locked up in prison; she lies, she deceives; she and her husband are 
enriching themselves, earning millions by mixing up the activities of their charita-
ble foundation with personal speaking engagements by Bill Clinton in Qatar or by 
Hillary to representatives of Wall Street. The Democratic candidate gave as good as 
she got: »Donald« was/is a sexist, racist, and chauvinist who harasses women, insults 
Muslims, makes fun of handicapped people, calls Latin American immigrants rap-
ists, discriminates against African Americans »just like his father,« and chronically 
evades taxes. There is little doubt that the American political campaigns of 2016 did 
indeed mark a historic nadir for democratic elections.
Where the post-democratic speculation misses the mark is in its claim that 
there are no differences between the programs on offer. In point of fact, the plat-
forms of Clinton and Trump did differ substantially. Trump adopted old neo-liberal 
formulas: cut taxes so that the investors will invest; get the economy growing and 
then jobs will come back from Mexico, China, Japan, or Europe. His proposals echo 
the famous napkin sketch drawn by Ronald Reagan’s chief economist, Arthur Laf-
fer, early in Reagan’s first term, to convince the late president that tax cuts not only 
would boost investment and GDP, but would also bring more revenue into govern-
ment coffers. George W. Bush, another economic layman, followed the same seduc-
tive recipe a decade later. In both cases, those policies led to the largest increases 
in public debt that American democracy has seen to date. And now comes Donald 
Trump. A tragedy of fiscal policy looks as though it will be followed by a farce. In 
this instance Trump will be adopting plans that presumably collide with the eco-
nomic interests of the (white) working class that he »discovered.« In this respect, 
at least for now, he is not following the more recent trend among European right-
wing populists, who have frequently moved away from their neo-liberal origins and 
gradually embraced social-nationalist programs. 
Trump’s proposals on foreign trade will elicit confusion even if they do not pro-
voke a trade war. In President Trump’s simplistic, Republican-populist view of the 
world, it is China, Europe, and the »disastrous« NAFTA treaty that have been steal-
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ing American jobs. Free trade agreements should be rolled back und punitive tariffs 
should be slapped on products from Asia and Europe if they don’t conform to the 
economic ideas of the USA. It is this bizarre mishmash of neo-liberal tax-cutting 
and deregulation at home coupled with protectionist threats aimed at foreign coun-
tries that the billionaire is offering to his countrymen and threatening to impose 
on the rest of the world. Trump’s plans for economic policymaking are squarely in 
accord with the national-protectionist programs of most right-wing populist parties.
In the United States the social welfare state is underdeveloped. There are histori-
cal reasons for this fact: the sanctity of private property, the ideology of the minimal 
state, the weakness of labor unions, the absence of a workers’ party, and the domi-
nance of an especially crude, untrammeled version of capitalism. So it was consid-
ered one of the great successes of Barack Obama’s first term in office that – despite 
the rabidly obstructionist policy of the Republican opposition – the President was 
able to offer health insurance even to low-income Americans through the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010). By contrast, to Trump the Affordable 
Care Act (aka »Obamacare«) is nothing but a disaster. Consequently, backed by his 
supporters, Trump and the Congressional Republicans are now attempting to roll 
back even this modest effort at social-welfare-state reform. Thus, he is again show-
ing his true colors as a neo-liberal resister of the social welfare state.
The biggest question marks concern foreign policy. Initially, Trump said little 
about what his policies would be, partly because he was a novice, and partly because 
he probably did not want to give away his negotiating positions in advance. But now, 
after several months in office, he has made his priority clear: »America first.« Trump 
sees international relations as a zero sum game. Hence, he wants to use American 
power to intimidate and outmaneuver other countries, especially in trade deals 
which he regards as his area of expertise. He has little use for notions of interna-
tional cooperation, compromise, and »win-win« policies. Instead, he believes that if 
the United States is tough enough, it will get what it wants by sheer bullying. After 
all, he assumes, other countries need the USA more than it needs them. That is the 
reason why he has already jettisoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, threatened to 
tear up the Paris Climate Accord, and opined that NATO may be »obsolete.« Like-
wise, he has undermined the United States’ bilateral relationships with key allies and 
friends. He insulted and humiliated Mexico, shocked the Australians by threatening 
to renege on an agreement to take some refugees from them, and alienated many 
Arab countries by promising to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Imperial Overstretch
Things could get uncomfortable for China and Europe. The United States already 
has asked Europe to contribute more toward NATO financing, arms procurement, 
and military operations. Moreover, Trump may double down on another favorite 
trick of American industrial policy: initiating lawsuits against European (German) 
firms. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether Trump will try to fight back against 
China’s authoritarian-statist policies on merchandise and capital exports. Even 
before taking office, Trump appeared to question the »one China« policy, a move 
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that does not bode well for the stability of international relations. And, in a quite 
undiplomatic way, he has opened several new fronts in foreign policy. Amid all this 
the USA might learn what imperial overstretch means.
Donald Trump won the election, at least in the sense that he won a majority in 
the Electoral College. In addition, the Republicans now have majorities in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives. Finally they control governorships in a 
majority of states and both chambers of 31 state legislatures (a key issue since gover-
nors and state legislatures draw electoral district boundaries). What enabled Trump 
and the GOP to win were the semi-democratic »winner takes all« or »first-past-
the-post« electoral system combined with the archaic Electoral College, in which 
state-by-state electoral votes rather than the overall national popular vote determine 
the outcome. Like Al Gore against George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton received a slim 
majority of the popular vote (a margin of 2.7 million votes), but her victory was 
transformed into a defeat by the Electoral College system, in which she won only 
232 electoral votes versus Trump’s 306. Voter participation in the Presidential elec-
tions was 59.8 % of eligible voters over 18 years of age (a statistic that excludes many 
otherwise eligible felons who are barred from voting – in some states for life): not 
impressive but much higher than the voter participation rate usually is in midterm 
Congressional elections (e.g., 2014), when 35 % is considered a good turnout.
Pippa Norris, a renowned scholar at Harvard who studies democracy and vot-
ing, has been investigating the integrity of elections in democracies and autocra-
cies for many years. Of 153 countries studied, the United States ranks only 52nd, 
an extremely poor outcome. Germany is in seventh place, while countries such as 
Croatia, Greece, Argentina, Mongolia, and South Africa all rank ahead of the USA. 
There are several reasons for the questionable integrity of American elections: the 
enormous influence of wealthy private donors upon campaigns and electoral pro-
grams, the frequent use of »gerrymandering« (the manipulative redrawing of elec-
toral district boundaries to favor one party), a system of voter registration that effec-
tively discriminates against African Americans and lower-class citizens, extremely 
low turnout for Congressional elections, the first-past-the-post-system itself, and 
the shamefully inadequate number of polling places given America’s level of tech-
nology and economic power. Long lines outside polling places, much as one might 
see in a country like Bangladesh, now define the familiar public image of American 
elections. 
American democracy is known for its elaborate checks and balances. Controls 
exercised by one branch of government over the powers of the others are especially 
well developed: Congress and the executive branch (the Presidency) may be con-
trolled by different parties; the American federal government has a relatively weak 
position vis-à-vis the states within the federal system itself; and the Supreme Court 
possesses broad powers of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, it is one of the most 
powerful such bodies in the world. However, for the time being Congress’s ability to 
check the executive branch will be fairly limited if Trump manages to mend fences 
with the Republican establishment and unite the GOP behind him. Still, the Republi-
can majority in the Senate is a relatively slim 52-48, so that chamber may not always 
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support his initiatives. But when it comes to making appointments to the federal 
courts, including one vacancy on the Supreme Court, Trump made it clear during 
the campaign that he would nominate a hand-picked conservative Justice, which he 
has done by choosing Neal Gorsuch of Colorado. The Senate Republican majority 
will not want to pass up a chance to shape the Court in a conservative direction for 
years to come. Yet Supreme Court nominees have to be confirmed by a qualified 
majority of 60 Senators, which means that at least eight Democrats would have to 
vote for Trump’s pick or that the GOP leadership will have to change the rules of 
the Senate such that a simple majority would suffice to confirm Gorsuch and any 
other future Supreme Court nominees (this is called the »nuclear option«). The cur-
rent alignment of political forces places fewer limits on President Trump than were 
intended by the Constitution. Indeed, he may have a freer hand than any Republican 
President has enjoyed since the 20s. The »mainstream media« (as Trump calls them) 
and watchdogs in civil society will have to take on a vital checking function. But 
no one should expect to see a push toward greater democratization or tolerance in 
American democracy over the next few years.
Trump: a right-wing populist?
Is Trump really a right-wing ideologue or is merely a demagogic, populist seducer 
who can be tamed by institutions, his advisors, and public opinion once he is in 
office? During the campaign, Trump often was portrayed as relatively immune to 
the influence of his advisors. But this perception has changed now that Steve Ban-
non, the white nationalist ex-director of the »alt-right« website Breitbart News, 
seems to have become Trump’s alter ego, having gotten access even to all meetings of 
the National Security Council, which even the Director of National Intelligence and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not always invited to attend.  Meanwhile, 
the available institutional checks on Trump will not work as well as »pure« Constitu-
tional theory teaches in an age of ascendant populism and with a majority in Con-
gress willing to support the President. Trump’s appointments to important cabinet 
posts, however, suggest a tilt toward crude, neo-liberal big business policies rather 
than a social-populist agenda. Thus, the more important question is: Who are the 
voters behind Trump? What do they signify for democracy? Preliminary voting 
studies indicate that he peeled away a majority of the white working class from the 
Democrats. In the final analysis, the voters who propelled Trump to victory seem to 
have been older, less-educated white males in the rust belt, rural areas, and the sub-
urbs of metropolitan areas. They have been the losers in economic globalization and 
fall into the bottom half of the American economic hierarchy. Their real wages have 
stagnated for two decades, and nothing President Obama’s Democratic administra-
tion did was able to change that. They belong to an element of the American popula-
tion that feels demographically, culturally, and economically threatened and has 
turned its back on Democratic policies perceived to favor the middle and even 
upper strata. But we might very well doubt whether their economic situation was 
the factor that drove their voting choices. To revise one of Bill Clinton’s famous slo-
gans: It’s not the economy, stupid! The white workers and less educated voters didn’t 
 N G | F H  – Q u a r t e r l y  2 | 2 017  25
refuse to vote for Hillary Clinton because they failed to hear her message. They 
voted against her because they did hear it. Clinton waged a campaign focused on 
issues of identity: for women, African Americans, Latinos, immigrants, homosexuals 
and transsexuals. But she had no message for the white workers and lower classes. In 
plain words: Policies toward minorities play an important role in a democracy. In 
the aloof debates carried on by the cultural and political establishment and amid the 
omnipresent moral indignation about even minor offenses against carefully moni-
tored rules of correct speech, cosmopolitan Democrats came to represent moral 
arrogance, and that is why they lost contact with the less educated classes in the 
country.
There are parallels between the outcome of the U.S. election and the reciprocal 
interactions currently taking place between social democratic parties in Western and 
Eastern Europe and their right-wing populist counterparts. Social democrats are by 
now thoroughly pervaded by the middle class and its values, and have redesigned 
their programs to appeal to that group. Established political forces, the media, pro-
gressives, the better-off, and the chorus of »rational« people are frequently satisfied 
with representing their own interests and their own version of cultural modernity. 
And when they hear conservative fears about »the loss of home,« of a certain urban 
neighborhood, of a familiar culture, the nation and its sovereignty, the meaning of 
borders, or the redefinition of marriage, they often do not respond with persuasive 
arguments. Instead, they lecture to and, not infrequently, exclude from the sphere of 
public discourse all those who have expressed such »politically incorrect« ideas. Dis-
courses have been dominated by a cosmopolitan and excessively moralistic spirit. 
For example, supporters of Brexit were written off as relics of yesteryear who do 
not understand the brave new world of cosmopolitanism and supra-nationalism. By 
the same token, those who vote for right-wing populist parties are dismissed as the 
moral, cognitive, and cultural troglodytes of our societies. In Western Europe, politi-
cal entrepreneurs have cultivated these »left-behind« elements, winning the alle-
giance of anywhere between 10 and 30 % of eligible voters for their cause or party. In 
Poland and especially in Hungary, right-wing populism has already given evidence 
of its ability to win majority support. And now it’s the turn of the United States, 
the pre-eminent power of the democratic West. But not all Trump voters are anti-
democratic racists, sexists, and chauvinists. What should arouse concern is the fact 
that it helped rather than hindered Trump when he was still a candidate to go before 
the public spouting intolerant slogans against the establishment, the »political class 
in Washington,« and »those at the top,« and in favor of »change.« A symptom of this 
disconnect was the final rally that the Democrats held just before the election, on 
November 7, 2016 in Philadelphia. It featured Barack and Michelle Obama, former 
President Bill Clinton, Bruce Springsteen and Jon Bon Jovi, an impressive »A-list« of 
establishment figures to have on stage. But a majority of Pennsylvania voters opted 
for Donald Trump, the outsider.
The better off and established members of our civil and political society have 
grown placid, smug, and deaf to the voices of those who are »at the bottom« whether 
in an economic or cultural sense. They are defending things as they are, including 
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their own privileges. The right has taken over the erstwhile battle cries of the left: the 
critique of elites and the privileged, the challenge to the status quo, and the call for 
change. The working class has gone over to the right-wing populists on both sides 
of the Atlantic. That is one reason why Donald Trump’s victory should be regarded 
as  a  warning shot. A representative  democracy  needs  to  represent  everyone, or  as  
close to it as possible. It has to allow for even reactionary or conservative criticism 
outside the bounds of political correctness. Once again, it must take seriously issues 
of  economic  and  cultural  distribution.  Moreover,  if  social  democrats  want  to  be  
understood  by  the  lower  classes  again, they  will  have  to  rein  in  their  schoolmas-
terly language with its stock of  politically correct ideas that have ever shorter half-
lives. None of this implies that they have to stop fighting for freedom, equality, and 
cultural modernizations of the last few decades. Nor must they abandon important 
aspects of  cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, those rights do have to be defended. 
But they are not the be-all and end-all of policymaking. Lectures from above, moral 
intransigence, or the discursive exclusion of »unrepresentable« and »irrational« peo-
ple and opinions destroy the bond between social democrats and the less privileged 
members of our society. And that does nothing but play into the hands of right-wing 
populists.
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